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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1969 riot at the Stonewall Inn, a gay bar in New York, is generally
considered to be the start of the modem gay rights movement.1 Since then, gay men,
lesbians, and bisexuals have actively pursued a status equal to that of heterosexuals
in arenas such as employment, housing, and health care.2
1. ANDREA WEISS & GRETA SCHILLER, BEFORE STONEWALL: THE MAKING OF A GAY AND LESBIAN
COMMUNrrY 5 (1988). The Stonewall riots were a backlash against continual harassment of gay bars by police.
See generally MARTIN DUBERMAN, STONEWALL (1993) (detailing the early gay movement and events leading up
to the Storewall riots through the lives of six people); THE QUESTION OF EQUALrrY: LESBIAN AND GAY RIGHTS
SINCE STONEWALL (David Deitcher ed., 1995) (outlining the pre-Stonewall homophile movement, discussing
strategies in the post-Stonewall era, assessing the relationship of gay men and lesbians to traditional institutions,
and evaluating the plight of gay and lesbian youth); WEISS & SCHILLER, supra (discussing the history of the gay
communit, and the development of the movement from 1900 to 1969). For a comprehensive history on the
subject, see JONATHAN KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY: LESBIANS AND GAY MEN IN THE U.S.A.: A
DOCUMENTARY (rev. ed., Meridian 1992) (tracking various aspects of gay and lesbian history, including excerpts
from 1528 to 1976). For a legal history perspective, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of
the Closet: Establishing Conditions for Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and Citizenship, 1961-1981, 25
HoFsTRA L. REv. 817 (1997).
2. For instance, gay and lesbian groups have attempted to equalize, treatment concerning employment
discrimination based on sexual orientation for the past 20 years. Aurelia Rojas, Davis Signs 3 Gay Rights Bills,
SACRAMErrO BEE, Oct. 3, 1999, at Al.
California has combated sexual orientation discrimination for quite some time. See Thomas Weathers,
Comment, Gay Civil Rights: Are Homosexuals Adequately Protected from Discrimination in Housing and
Employment?, 24 PAC. L.J. 541, 543 nn.12-13 (1993) (listing bills that the California Legislature has passed to
prohibit sexual orientation discrimination, mostly dealing with employment and housing; most of these bills were
vetoed). The FairEmployment and Housing Act (FEHA), CAL. GOV'TCODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 1992 & Supp.
2000), prohibits discrimination on various bases, but prior to the 1999 legislative session, sexual orientation was
not included among the list of protected classes. See, e.g., 1993 Cal. Stat. ch. 711, see. 2, at 4040 (amending CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 12940) (prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of "race, religious creed, color,
national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, marital status, or sex"); 1993
Cal. Stat. ch. 1277, sec. 4, at 7514 (amending CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12955) (prohibiting discrimination in housing
on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, marital status, national origin, ancestry, familial status, or disability");
Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 488, 595 P.2d 592 (1979) (construing the Fair
Employment Practices Act, now part of the FEHA, as not including discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation). In 1991, Governor Wilson vetoed a bill that would have added sexual orientation to the FEHA. See
MICHAEL NAVA & ROBERT DAwmOFF, CREATED EQUAL: WHY GAY RIGHTS MATTER TO AMERICA ix-xi (1994)
(describing the reaction of the gay community to the gubernatorial veto). In 1992, the legislature added a provision
to the Labor Code that prohibited discrimination in employment based on sexual orientation, but significant
disparities inhered in the protection that was provided. See 1992 Cal. Stat. ch. 915, sec. 2, at 4400 (enacting CAL.
LABOR CODE § 1102.1) (prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of sexual orientation or perceived
sexual orientation). See generally Weathers, supra (discussing the protections provided by law, and concluding
that they are not adequate).
During the 1997-1998 legislative session, a bill to add sexual orientation to the list of protected classes in
the FEHA and to remove sexual orientation from the Labor Code was vetoed by Governor Wilson, who believed
that adequate protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation were already in existence. See
Governor's Veto Message (AB 257), Oct. 10, 1997 (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reflecting the
belief that the inclusion of sexual orientation provisions in the Labor Code has provided a "fair, effective, and
efficient remedy to such complaints," and further noting that 90% of the 174 cases filed under that section had
been resolved). In the 1999-2000 session, however, Assemblymember Villaraigosa was successful in passing a
bill almost identical to the vetoed measure. See 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 592, sec. 1-17, at 3424-58 (amending
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Progress has been made on some issues, but inequity still remains.3 The status of
people in relationships with persons of the same sex has been debated in various
contexts for a number of years
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12920, 12921, 12926, 12930, 12931, 12935, 12940, 12944, 12955.8, and 12993, and
amending, repealing, and enacting CAL. GoV'TCODE § 12955, andrepealing CAL LABORCODE § 1102.1) (adding
sexual orientation discrimination to prohibitions contained in the FEHA, and removing such provisions from the
Labor Code); see also Victoria K. Lin, Embracing Minority Housing and Employment Rights in the New
Millennium, 31 McGEORGE L. REV. 211 (2000) (evaluating the provisions of the new law, Chapter 592). See
generally NAVA & DAWIDOFF, supra, at xi (arguing that the pursuit of equal rights for gay men and lesbians is
vitally important to the protection of individual liberties in the U.S.).
3. Ten states other than California have enacted laws prohibiting private employers from discriminating
on the basis of sexual orientation. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81c (West 1995) (barring sexual orientation
discrimination in employment); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2 (Supp. 1998) (same); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 15 1B,
§ 4 (West Supp. 2000) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West Supp. 2000) (same); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
613.330 (Michie Supp. 2000) (same); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:7 (Supp. 1998) (same); NJ. STAT. ANN. §
10:5-12 (West Supp. 1999) (same); LI. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7 (Supp. 1999) (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495
(Supp. 1999) (same); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.36 (West 1997) (same); see also States, Cities and Counties that
Prohibit Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation in Private Employment (visited Feb. 29, 2000)
<http.//www.hr.orgissues/workplac/nd/ndjuris.html> (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (maintaining
a list of public entities that have similar laws).
When the same-sex partner of an employee is eligible for insurance benefits, the benefits that the
partner receives are taxable. See I.RC. § 105(b) (West Supp. 1999) (establishing that only health benefits for the
taxpayer, the taxpayer's spouse, and the taxpayer's dependents are tax-deductible). See generally Lindsay Brooke
King, Note, Enforcing Conventional Morality Through Taxation?: Determining the Excludability of Employer-
Provided Domestic Partner Health Benefits Under Sections 105(a) and 106 of the Internal Revenue Code, 53
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 301 (1996) (evaluating domestic partner benefits with respect to federal income taxes).
4. See, e.g., Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that, in the context of
immigration laws, a citizen's spouse necessarily means a person of the opposite sex); Brause v. Bureau of Vital
Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI., 1998 WL 88743, at *6 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) (ordering further
hearings to determine if a compelling state interest is furthered by the ban on same-sex marriages in the Alaska
Marriage Code); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 318, 331 (D.C. 1995) (holding that marriages
between persons of the same sex are prohibited and the ability to enter into such marriages does not amount to
a fundamental right); Baehrv. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44,68 (Haw. 1993) (remanding the case to allow the State to show
a compelling interest for the denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples), enforced sub nom. Baehr v. Milke,
CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *22 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996) (holding that the denial of marriage
licenses to same-sex couples was unconstitutional sex-based discrimination and in violation of the equal protection
clause of the Hawaii Constitution), affd, 950 P.2d 1234,1234 (Haw. 1997), appeal dismissed as moot, No. 20371,
1999 Haw. LEXIS 391, at *5 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999) (ruling that the denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples
is not violative of the equal protection clause of the Hawaii Constitution in light of a recently passed amendment
that gives the Legislature the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d
588, 590 (Ky. 1973) (holding that two female persons, by definition, cannot enter into a marriage); Baker v.
Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) (holding that marriages between persons of the same sex are
prohibited and that such prohibitions are not unconstitutional); Storrs v. Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286, 287-88
(1996) (same), appeal dismissed on other grounds, 666 N.Y.S.2d 835, 835 (1997); Estate of Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d
684, 688 (1990) (holding that a surviving partner in a same-sex relationship is not a "surviving spouse" with the
right to elect against the will of the deceased partner); De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952, 952 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1984) (holding that two people of the same sex may not form a common law marriage); Titchenal v. Dexter, 693
A.2d 689-90 (Vt. 1997) (holding that the same-sex partner of an adoptive parent, if the partner had not also
adopted the child, had no right to parent-child contact as an equitable or de facto parent); Vasquez v. Hawthorne,
994 P.2d 240, 243 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that two people of the same sex may not enter into a "quasi-
marital" relationship); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (holding that the denial of a
marriage license to a same-sex couple violates neither the U.S. Constitution nor the Washington Constitution).
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Some companies and various state and local governments have recognized a
status of "domestic partnership" (DP), loosely defined as two unmarried adults in
a committed relationship.' With the passage of time, several institutions have
recognized domestic partners, and some have granted benefits previously available
only to married couples. These moves prompted California to enact Chapter 588.
This new law creates a registry for same-sex and senior citizen domestic partners,
and grants limited benefits to registered couples.7 While a DP registry has the
potential to provide benefits to such couples, Chapter 588, in its present form, falls
far short of its potential.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Existing Law: Marriage in California
California Family Code section 300 defines marriage as "a personal relation
arising out of a civil contract between a man and a woman."8 If a man and a woman
wish to be married in California, the only requirement is that both parties be
To date, the Supreme Court of Vermont has made the most significant ruling on the subject. See Baker v.
Vermont,744 A.2d 864, 886-87 (Vt. 1999) (holding that, under the Vermont Constitution, same-sex couples are
entitled "to obtain the same benefits and protections afforded by Vermont law to married opposite-sex couples,"
and directing the Legislature to enact appropriate legislation); id. at 898 (Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting)
("[W]e should simply enjoin the State from denying marriage licenses to plaintiffs based on sex or sexual
orientation"). For arguments presented in the case, see generally Mary Bonauto et al., The Freedom to Marry for
Same-Sex Couples: The Opening Appellate Brief of Plaintiffs Stan Baker et al. in Baker et al. v. State of Vermont,
5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 409 (1999); Mary Bonauto et al., The Freedom to Marry for Same-Sex Couples: The
Reply Brief ofPlaintiffs Stan Baker et al. in Baker et al. v. State of Vermont, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1999).
5. See infra note 23 (listing various companies that provide domestic partnership (DP) benefits to their
employees); infra note 28 (listing some of the governmental bodies in California that recognize domestic partners).
6. See infra notes 18-34 and accompanying text (documenting the creation and implementation of
domestic partner registries and the extent to which such partnerships have been recognized).
7. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297(b), 299.5(a) (enacted by Chapter 588); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1261
(enacted by Chapter 588). California is the second state to institute a statewide DP registry. Hawaii established
the first such registry in 1996. See generally W. Brian Burnette, Note, Hawaii's Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act: An
Effective Step in Resolving the Controversy Surrounding Same Sex Marriage, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 81 (1998)
(evaluating the Hawaii act).
8. CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (West 1994). Senator Pete Knight (R-Palmdale) gathered enough signatures
to put an initiative on the March 2000 ballot which explicitly stated that only a marriage between a man and a
woman would be recognized in California; any same-sex couple that was married legally in another state would
not have a valid marriage in California. See Jon Matthews, Famed Ex-Pilot Fights Gay Marriage, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Oct. 6, 1999, at Al (recounting Senator Knight's efforts concerning the initiative and similar efforts in the
California Legislature). The initiative passed, with 61% of voters in favor. Carol Ness, Prop. 22 Passage Forces
Gays to Regroup; Only 5 Counties Reject Knight Initiative, S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 8,2000, at Al. Senator Knight
introduced similar measures in the Legislature in 1995 and 1997, but these were defeated. See SB 911 (1997) (as
introduced on Feb. 27, 1997, but not enacted) (proposing an exception to the recognition of marriages performed
in other states to exclude same-sex marriages); AB 1982 (1995) (as amended on Jan. 12, 1996, but not enacted)
(same).
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 31
capable of consenting to the marriage.9 Married couples gain various benefits from
their status as "married.""0 Unmarried couples are governed largely by contract law:
if there is no contract, then there are no rights or obligations between the parties. 1
B. Same-Sex Marriage
Same-sex couples are not permitted to marry in any state.12 Thus, none of the
benefits of marriage are automatically available to any same-sex couple, regardless
of the length of their relationship.13 Several states have enacted laws forbidding
9. CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (West 1994); see id. § 301 (West 1994) (declaring that unmarried persons over
the age of 18 who are "not otherwise disqualified" are capable of consenting to marriage); id. § 302 (West 1994)
(asserting that minors are capable of consent upon filing a court order or the written consent of a parent).
10. These benefits include the following: the right to sue for wrongful death; rights to statutory benefits
such as insurance; presumptions ofjoint ownership rights; inheritance rights; survivor benefits; additional Social
Security benefits; and the right of an American's non-American spouse to become an American citizen. WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 66-
67(1996).
11. FREDERICKHERTZ,LEoALAFFAIRS:ESSENTIALADVICEFORSAME-SEXCOUPLES 15 (1998); see, e.g.,
Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 665, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (1976) (holding that provisions of California law
regarding the division of property do not apply to unmarried couples, but that the court will enforce express
contracts between such couples "except to the extent that the contract is explicitly founded on the consideration
of meretricious sexual services").
12. HAYDEN CURRYETAL, ALEGALGUIDEFORLEsBIANANDGAYCOUPLES 1/3 (10th ed. 1999). Several
European communities, including the countries of Sweden, Denmark, and Iceland, and some cities in Italy and
Spain, have given various legal rights to same-sex couples, but the status given is not the same as "marriage." Id.
Hungary allows same-sex couples to be covered by the common law marriage rules, but does not allow them to
register as married couples. l.
13. James M. Donovan, An Ethical Argument to Restrict Domestic Partnerships to Same-Sex Couples, 8
LAW & SEXUALITY 649, 659 (1998). One author's view on the denial of benefits to unmarried couples is that:
This discussion lumps these two situations together as being two instances of a single type, the
discrimination against committed but unmarried couples. But actually they are not. Unmarried
heterosexuals are excluded from these marriage benefits in the same way that six-year-olds are
excluded from college. The disability is neither permanent nor prejudicial when, at a more appropriate
time, the person chooses to claim this prerogative. That all benefits and privileges are not available at
all stages of life is not presumptively discriminatory, nor even particularly unusual.
Gays, on the other hand, are "excluded" from marriage benefits in the way that dogs are excluded
from college. The proper question is not whether, at any given moment, one has access to all benefits
society has to offer, but whether these benefits are permanently out of reach, especially through no
fault of your own.
... Heterosexuals choose not to qualify, and that is a world of difference, a difference of ethical
distinction, whether or not it rises to one of legal notice.
Same-sex couples in the countries that allow same-sex couples to form "registered partnerships" are not
given all of the rights that come with marriage. CURRY Er AL., supra note 12, at 1/3. In Denmark, Iceland, and
Sweden, same-sex couples are specifically not allowed to adopt children. Id. In the Netherlands, however, there
is a movement to explicitly include same-sex couples in the marriage laws, which would make it the first country
to do so. Id. See generally Craig A. Sloane, Note, A Rose by Any Other Name: Marriage and the Danish
Registered Partnership Act, 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMp. L. 189 (1997) (concluding that the Danish Act is an
important step, but that the omission of critical rights relegates registered same-sex partnerships to a less-favored
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recognition of married couples of the same sex, regardless of whether the marriage
was considered legal in the jurisdiction in which it was performed.' 4 A very small
number of states have introduced legislation that would legalize same-sex
marriage. 15
The federal government spoke on the matter in 1996, when President Clinton
signed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). t6 DOMA denies federal recognition
of same-sex marriages performed in any state, and allows individual states to decide
whether to recognize same-sex marriages legally performed in other states.'
7
position than that of registered (married) opposite-sex partnerships).
14. ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (2000); ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013 (Michie 1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 25-101(c), 25-112 (West Supp. 1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-208(b), (c) (Michie Supp. 1997); DEL. CODE
ANN. tiL13, § 101(a), (d) (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212 (West Supp. 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1
(1999); IDAHOCODE §§ 32-201,32-209 (1996); 750ILL.COMP.STAT. 5201, 5/212(a)(5), 5/216 (West 1999); IND.
CODEANN. § 31-11-1-1 (West 1999); IOWA CODEANN. §§ 595.2(1),595.20 (West Supp. 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 23-101, 23-115 (Supp. 1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 402.005, 402.020(l)(d), 402.045 (Banks-Baldwin
1999); LA. Ctv. CODEANN. art. 89,94,3520 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701(1),
(1-A), (5) (West 1998); MISS. CODEANN. § 93-1-1(2) (Supp. 1999); N.C.GEN.STAT. §§ 51-1,51-1.2 (1999); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 14-03-01,14-03-08 (1997); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (West Supp. 1999); S.C. CODEANN.
§§ 20-1-10,20-1-15 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1999);TENN. CODEANN. § 36-3-113 (1996); UTAHCODEANN. §§ 30-1-
2(5), 30-1-4 (1998 & Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (Michie Supp. 1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.04.02C'1)(c), (3) (West Supp. 2000). Montana prohibits same-sex marriages and contractual relations
designed to create a civil relationship that is prohibited under the marriage laws; DP laws may constitute such a
contractual relationship. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-401(1)(d), (4) (1999) (stating that such contractual
relationships are void as against public policy). Declaring an action to be against public policy invokes the public
policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which means that a state would not
have to recognize the act. Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public
Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.L 1965,1971-75 (1997); see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall
be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."); infra note 17
(listing several analyses of the Defense of Marriage Act with respect to the Full Faith and Credit Clause). South
Dakota prohibits same-sex marriages, but does not expressly prohibit same-sex marriages performed in other
jurisdictions. See S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 25-1-1, 25-1-38 (Michie 1999) (defining marriage as a contract
"between a man and a woman," but not restricting foreign marriages). Until recently, California's situation was
the same. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (West 1994) ("Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract
between a man and a woman'); iaL § 308 (West 1994) ("A marriage contracted outside this state that would be
valid by the laws of the jurisdiction in which the marriage was contracted is valid in this state."); supra note 8
(describing changes to these provisions through the California initiative process).
15. E.g., HB 1259 (Md. 1998) (as introduced on Feb. 13, 1998, but not enacted); IB 609 (Md. 1997) (as
introduced cn Jan. 30, 1997, but not enacted); liB 3886 (Mass. 1999) (as introduced on Jan. 6, 1999, but not
enacted); LB 407 (Neb. 1997) (as introduced on Jan. 16, 1997, but not enected); LB 1260 (Neb. 1995) (as
introduced on Jan. 17, 1996, but not enacted); HB 5517 (R.I. 1999) (as introduced on Feb. 2, 1999, but not
enacted); HtB 7994 (RI. 1997) (as introduced on Feb. 3, 1998, but not enacted); SB 5346 (Wash. 1997) (as
introduced on Jan. 22, 1997, but not enacted).
16. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419, 2420 (codified at 1 U.S.C.A. § 7, 28
U.S.C.A. § 1738C (1996)).
17. See 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West 1997) (providing that the "Definition of Marriage" includes only a union
between a man and a woman, and defining "spouse" as someone necessarily of the opposite sex); 28 U.S.C.A. §
1738C (West Supp. 1999) (allowing states to decide whether to recognize a same-sex marriage which is legal in
another state). For arguments on both sides of the issue, see generally The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearings on
S. 1740 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996); The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearings
on H.R. 3396 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996).
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C. Domestic Partnerships
Somewhat recently, the language of "domestic partnership" was born."
"Domestic partners" may be either cohabiting same-sex couples or cohabiting,
unmarried opposite-sex couples.' 9 The DP originated in the private sector,2" but
several local governments have since initiated DP registries for cohabiting
couples.21
1. Private Sector Domestic Partnerships
Private companies entered the DP world first, providing health care benefits or
bereavement leave to employees' domestic partners.' Several companies now
Regarding employee benefit programs, the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) is of substantial concern. See
Domestic Partner Benefits Provide Equity, Flexibility for More Employees, EMPLOYEE BENEFRT PLAN REV., June
1, 1999, at 48, available in 1999 WL 13937998 [hereinafter Domestic Partner Benefits] (expressing concerns
about federal non-recognition of a same-sex marriage that is legal under state law).
The constitutionality of DOMA has been questioned on various bases. See, e.g., James M. Donovan, DOMA:
An Unconstitutional Establishment of Fundamentalist Christianity, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 335, 373 (1997)
(showing DOMA to be prompted by no secular purpose whatsoever and characterizing it as an unconstitutional
establishment of religion); Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Same-Sex Marriages and the Defense of Marriage Act: A
Deviant Wew of an Experiment in Full Faith and Credit, 32 CREIGHTONL. REV. 409,456 (1998) (finding DOMA
to be a constitutionally legitimate exercise of Congress's power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause); Mark
Strasser, Baker and Some Recipes for Disaster: On DOMA, Covenant Marriages, and Full Faith and Credit
Jurisprudence, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 307,350-51 (1998) (concluding that DOMA is unconstitutional under the Full
Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses); Alec Walen, The "Defense of Marriage Act" and Authoritarian
Morality, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 619, 638-42 (1997) (evaluating the arguments in support of DOMA on
moralistic grounds); Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the
Defense of Marriage Act, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 255, 391-92 (1998) (concluding that DOMA is not
unconstitutional in view of the history of the Full Faith and Credit Clause); Charles J. Butier, Note, The Defense
of Marriage Act: Congress's Use of Narrative in the Debate over Same-Sex Marriage, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 841,
879 (1998) (concluding that "DOMA may violate the Equal Protection Clause"); Jennie R. Shuki-Kunze, Note,
The "Defenseless" Marriage Act: The Constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act as an Extension of
Congressional Power Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 351, 379 (1998)
(concluding that DOMA is unconstitutional under the Full Faith and Credit Clause); Sherri L. Toussaint,
Comment, Defense of Marriage Act: Isn't It Ironic... Don't You Think? A Little Too Ironic?, 76 NEB. L. REV.
924, 927-28 (1997) (concluding that DOMA is unconstitutional with regard to federal and state equal protection
laws).
18. See CURRY El AL, supra note 12, at 1/7-1/8 (documenting the short history of DP programs).
19. Domestic Partner Benefits, supra note 17, at 48; see Robert L. Eblin, Note, Domestic Partner
Recognition in the Workplace: Equitable Employee Benefits for Gay Couples (and Others), 51 OHIO ST. LJ. 1067,
1069 n.h 1 (1990) (listing "domestic partner," "named partner," and "significant other" as terms used to refer to
eligible participants with respect to benefit programs).
20. See infta Part ll.C.1 (reviewing the development of domestic partner benefits in the private sector).
21. See infra Part H.C.2 (examining the extent of DP registries provided by local governments).
22. CURRY ETAL, supra note 12, at 117-1/8. In 1982, the Village Voice became the first company to offer
DP benefits to its employees. Il at 1/8.
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provide DP benefits.23 Most companies that do not provide DP benefits cite
prohibitively high costs of insuring DPs and the difficulty of finding insurance
carriers that are willing to insure DPs.24 A general problem for businesses wishing
to provide DP benefits is the ability to verify whether two people really are
domestic partners, or if they are merely roommates who are attempting to take
advantage of the system.2 Unlike married couples, cohabiting but unmarried
couples have no particular legal documents26 confirming their status of "being in
a committed relationship." Each company choosing to provide DP benefits has had
to design and implement its own system for verifying that a person is eligible to
participate in the program.27
23. Companies and organizations providing benefits to DPs (same-sex only or both same- and opposite-sex
couples) include ABC, Apple Computer, CBS, Disney Corporation, Dow Chemical, Eastman Kodak, FOX, IBM,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters #70, Levi Strauss & Co., Mattel, Novell, PBS, Pacific Stock Exchange,
Inc., Paramount Pictures, Seagate Technology, Inc., Silicon Graphics, Southern California Gas Co., Viacom, and
Warner Brathers. SENATEJUDICIARY COMMrEE, COMmrTEE ANALYSIS Op AB 26, at 11 (July 7, 1999). United
Airlines offers DP benefits to same-sex and opposite-sex couples, but the benefits provided are not equal. Edward
Epstein, United Airlines Capitulates on Partners Issues; Full Benefits Worldwide for Gay Lesbian Couples, S.F.
CHRON., July 31, 1999, at Al. Some California universities have also extended benefits to domestic partners,
including the University of California, the University of Southern California, Golden Gate Univerity, and the
California Institute of Technology. SENATEJUDICIARY COMITrEE, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OFAB 26, at I 1 (July
7, 1999). In 1995, the State Bar of California became the first professional organization to offer health benefits
to both same-sex and opposite-sex domestic partners of members. Health Briefs: California Bar Covers Domestic
Partners, Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA), at 1669, 1669 (July 17, 1995). See generally James P. Baker, Equal Benefits
for Equal Work? The Law of Domestic Partner Benefits, 14 LAB. LAw. 23, 49-52 (1998) (listing the types and
scope of benefits offered to domestic partners by nine specific companies and two university systems).
24. See Baker, supra note 23, at 43-47 (recognizing that cost is the major factor in considering whether
to offer DP benefits). But see id. at 44-45 (observing that companies offering DP benefits have found that the
additional cost is low or zero).
25. See iU. at 47-49 (stating that the difficulty of defining "domestic partners" and the decision about
whether to limit DP benefits to same-sex couples can be barriers to extending benefits to such couples); Edward
J. Juel, Note, Non-Traditional Family Values: Providing Quasi-Marital Rights to Same-Sex Couples, 13 B.C.
THIRD WORLD LJ. 317,339 (1993) (revealing that fraud is not prevalent, and is in fact unlikely, due to employer
safeguards); King, supra note 3, at 313-14 (noting that many employers are concerned about both increased costs
and the potential for fraud).
26. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 350-360 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000) (indicating the necessity of obtaining a
marriage license, and further specifying the contents of the license and other administrative details).
27. See Domestic Partner Benefits, supra note 17, at 48 (shedding light on the difficulties that
implementation presents with regard to treating employees consistently and maintaining coherent company
policies). Conversely, most employers do not require married couples to produce copies of their marriage licenses
when they apply for benefits. Id Companies usually reserve the right to ask for proof of marriage at any time, but
rarely ask. Id. This raises an interesting point, for many opponents of DP benefits would then seem to believe that
more people would lie about their status to take advantage of DP benefits. Juel, supra note 25, at 339-40. Is it
more probable that people would lie to obtain benefits for an unmarried friend of the same sex than for an
unmarried friend of the opposite sex?
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2. Domestic Partnership Registration
Several local governments throughout the nation have established DP
registries.28 DP registration is analogous to obtaining a marriage license. The
California Legislature has previously considered establishing a state registry, but
it had not done so before Chapter 588.29
Few tangible benefits, if any, are given to registered couples,30 but registries
provide documentation by an official agency and often create legal responsibilities
between the parties.31 Exceptions exist with regard to this no-benefit policy, but not
many.32 The response to available registries is mixed.33 The advantage of having a
state or local government administer the registry is that such will provide a
centralized location for companies to obtain verification information 4
28. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITIEE. COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 26, at 11 (July 7, 1999). The City of
Berkeley was the first municipality to establish a DP registry, in 1984. CuRRY Er AL, supra note 12, at 1/8. Other
local governments in California that have established DP registries include Alameda, Laguna Beach, Los Angeles,
Oakland, Petaluma, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco, Santa Barbara, Santa Cruz, and West Hollywood.
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMIT=E ANALYSIS OF AB 26, at 11 (July 7, 1999). County governments
providing DP benefits include Los Angeles, Main, San Francisco, San Mateo and Santa Cruz. Id.
29. SENATE RULES COMMITEE, FLOOR ANALYSIS OFAB 26, at 7-8 (Sept. 5,1999). In recent years, several
bills containing almost identical language have not become law, either by failure to pass in the Legislature or by
Governor's veto. See, e.g., AB 1059 (1997) (as amended on Sept. 4, 1997, but not enacted) (proposing DP
insurance benefits for public and private employees); AB 427 (1997) (as amended on Jan. 5, 1998, but not
enacted) (proposing DP insurance benefits for public employees); AB 54 (1996) (as amended on May 1, 1997,
but not enacted) (proposing DP registry with conservatorship and will provisions); AB 1982 (1995) (as amended
on Aug. 19, 1996, but not enacted) (same); AB 627 (1995) (as amended on July 21, 1995, but not enacted) (same);
AB 1209 (1995) (as introduced on Feb. 23, 1995, but not enacted) (proposing DP insurance benefits for public
employees); AB 2810 (1994) (as amended on Aug. 8, 1994, but not enacted) (proposing DP registry); SB 2061
(1994) (as amended on Aug. 26, 1994, but not enacted) (proposing DP insurance benefits for public employees).
30. See, e.g., Wis Briefs, A.P. Newswires, July 14, 1999, available in WESTLAW, APWIRES Database
(noting that Milwaukee's new DP registry "carries no legal, health care, or other tangible benefit").
31. See, e.g., DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP INFORMATION SHEET 3 (City of Davis ed., 1994) (copy on file with
the McGeorge Law Review) ("If you sign a domestic partnership [agreement], you promise to make sure that your
partner has basic food and shelter.... If your partner can't get food or shelter for themselves, they can make you
get them.").
32. For example, Florida's Broward County offers health benefits to same-sex and opposite-sex domestic
partners of county employees, in addition to providing a registry. Scott Gold, Pairs Saying 'I Do' to Legal
Couplehood; Most Registering First Day Are Gay, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), July 13, 1999, at IA.
The county also provides bidding advantages to companies who provide DP benefits to their employees. Id.
33. See Robert D. Davila, After Five Years, Domestic Partners Law Still Praised, SACRAMENTOBEE, Nov.
9, 1997, at BI (noting that 368 couples had registered in Sacramento's DP registry within five years of the
registry's enactment, and that most of those registrants are same-sex couples); Martin Wisckol, Finding Benefits
in Partnership; Trends: More Nonmarried Straight Couples Are Enjoying a Fringe Originally Designedfor Gays,
ORANGE COUNTY REG., May 2, 1999, at A01 (mentioning that, between May 1992 and March 1999, the DP
registry in Laguna Beach registered 234 same-sex couples and 28 opposite-sex couples). But see Donovan, supra
note 13, at 657 (noting that the majority of couples that benefit from DP benefit plans are opposite-sex couples).
34. This means that private companies wishing to provide DP benefits will not have to design and
implement their own systems, and perhaps this would create an incentive for more companies to provide DP
benefits. See Jesse Garza, D'Amato Wants City to Certify Same-Sex Couples, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 28,
1999, at 7 (expressing the hope that providing a definition of DP would encourage private companies to provide
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D. Senior Citizens
Senior citizen couples face a different problem. While some of these couples
are same-sex, most of them are opposite-sex couples who have the option of getting
married. However, many of these couples receive pension or Social Security
benefits that would be significantly reduced or eliminated if they were to get
married.35 Thus, many of these couples do not consider marriage to be an
economically viable option.
ml1. CHAPTER 588
A. Requirements for Domestic Partnership Registration
Chapter 588 establishes a statewide DP registry.36 'Tvo adults wishing to form
a DP must complete and file a Declaration of Domestic Partnership, have it
notarized, and pay a fee. 37 The requirements to form a DP are similar to those
necessary to form a marriage. 38 Two persons wishing to form a marriage or a DP
must be over eighteen,39 capable of consenting to DP or marriage,4" not related by
blood in certain ways,4 and not already married or in a DP.42 The new law also
requires that "[b]oth persons agree to be jointly responsible for each other's basic
living expenses during the domestic partnership. 43 This agreement parallels an
obligation that is automatically created upon the formation of a marriage: a married
person is personally liable for living expenses incurred by the person's spouse while
the parties are living together.44 Partners must share a common residence,45 which
DP benefits).
35. Elizabeth Fenner & Roberta Kirwan, Sizing up the Risks ofLiving Together, MOwEY, July 1, 1995, at
96. Remarriage often means losing any benefits from a deceased spouse, or forfeiting a capital-gains tax exclusion
on the sale of a house. l
36. CAL. FAM. CODE § 298 (enacted by Chapter 588).
37. Id. §§ 298,298.5 (enacted by Chapter 588). The fee for filing a Declaration of DP is $10. Thomas D.
Elias, Calif Homosexual Couples Register; Many Resent Getting Fraction of Benefits Granted to Others, WASH.
TIMEs, Jan. 16,2000, at C8.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 39-46 (comparing the requirements of DP under Chapte 588 and
marriage under existing California law).
39. CAL. FAM. CODE § 301 (West 1994); id. § 297(b)(5) (enacted by Chapter 588).
40. Id, § 300 (West 1994); id. 297(b)(7) (enacted by Chapter 588).
41. Id. § 2200 (West 1994) ("Marriages between parents and children, ancestors and descendants of every
degree, and between brothers and sisters of the half as well as the whole blood, and between uncles and nieces
or aunts and nephews, are incestuous, and void from the beginning, whether the relationship is legitimate or
illegitimate."); id. § 297(b)(4) (enacted by Chapter 588).
42. Id. § 2201 (West 1994) (declaring a marriage void if a party is already married); id.§ 297(b)(3)
("Neither person is married or a member of another domestic partnership.').
43. Id. § 297(b)(2) (enacted by Chapter 588).
44. Id. § 914(a)(1) (West 1994).
45. id. § 297(b)(1) (enacted by Chapter 588).
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seems to be an indication that the proposed partners are "in an intimate and
committed relationship." 6
Under Chapter 588, both parties to a DP must either be of the same sex or over
the age of 62.' Furthermore, the new law explicitly provides that the only opposite-
sex DPs that may be formed are those in which both parties are over the age of 62.48
While an earlier version of Chapter 588 made the registry available to both same-
sex and opposite-sex couples,49 this was changed at the request of Governor Davis,
who indicated that he believed that same-sex couples deserve recognition, but
should not be allowed to marry, and that opposite-sex couples "could simply choose
to get married., 50 The provisions for opposite-sex couples over the age of 62 were
also a late addition.51
Chapter 588 preempts DPs created under local laws before July 1, 2000; a DP
will remain valid only if the couple files a Declaration of Domestic Partnership with
the Secretary of State.52 However, local jurisdictions may retain any rights they
grant or duties they impose on DPs that supplement those provided by this law.53
B. Rights and Obligations of Domestic Partnerships
Chapter 588 explicitly states that the obligations imposed on the partners by
virtue of forming a DP are contained in Family Code section 2 97, 4 which currently
consists of eligibility requirements for forming DPs.55 The rights acquired by DPs
are limited to those contained in Division 2.5 of the Family Code, in which no
explicit rights are created, and the hospital visitation privileges in the Health and
46. Id. § 297(a) (enacted by Chapter 588). Common residence requirements are often part of defining
domestic partners in benefit programs, which is often a problem for DPs in which both partners are professionals.
See Domestic Partner Benefits, supra note 17, at 48 (highlighting implementation problems caused by requiring
that partners share the same permanent residence). California's registry does not preclude forming a DP between
partners who maintain separate residences but travel between them. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(c) (enacted by
Chapter 588) ('"wo people have a common residence even if one or both have additional residences. Domestic
partners do not cease to have a common residence if one leaves the common residence but intends to return.").
47. Id. § 297(b)(6) (enacted by Chapter 588).
48. Id. § 297(b)(6)(B) (enacted by Chapter 588).
49. AB 26 (1998) (as amended on Apr. 8, 1999, but not enacted).
50. Robert Salladay, Governor Forces Weaker Bill on Domestic Partners; Benefits Limited to Gay State
Workers, S.F. EXAMINER, July 8, 1999, at A6.
51. Compare AB 26 (1998) (as amended on Aug. 16, 1999, but not enacted) (limiting DP registration to
partners of the same sex), with CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b)(6)(B) (enacted by Chapter 588) (providing that partners
of the opposite sex may register if both are over the age of 62).
52. CAL. FAM. CODE § 299.6(a)-(b) (enacted by Chapter 588).
53. Id. § 299.6(c) (enacted by Chapter 588).
54. Id. § 299.5(a) (enacted by Chapter 588).
55. Id. § 297 (enacted by Chapter 588).
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Safety Code.56 Any obligations that are created between the partners are terminated
when the DP is terminated. 7
Formation of a DP does not change the character of any property owned by
either partner before the DP was formed, nor does it create any community property
or quasi-community property rights.5' The partners will proportionally own any
property they acquire in shared title during the tenure of the DP; the proportions are
to be determined at the time the interest is acquired. 59 Finally, formation of a DP
does not change the individual or estate tax liability of a partner?°
Chapter 588 allows state and local employers to offer health benefits to
domestic partners of employees.6' An earlier version of Chapter 588 applied to
private employers,62 but this portion of the bill was amended at Governor Davis's
request. 3 DPs seeking benefits are to submit proof of a valid Declaration of
Domestic Partnership to verify that they are eligible to receive these benefits.6
Employers are not required to provide these benefits;65 the intent of these provisions
is to give employers the ability to provide the benefits if they wish to do so.
6
Domestic partners are considered "family members" for most purposes, but not for
any purpose relating to death or survivorship benefits.67 The fact that employers are
not required to provide these benefits could result in no insurance benefit gain at all
for registered DPs in which one partner is a public employee. However, some
employers are likely to provide benefits to eligible couples as a show of support for
their relationships.'
Finally, Chapter 588 provides that health facilities are to accord visitation
privileges to a domestic partner, the children of a domestic partner, and a parent's
domestic partner, subject to certain exceptions.69 The stated intent of Chapter 588
is to provide health facilities with "the authority to administer [visitation] policies
56. Id. § 299.5(a) (enacted by Chapter 588).
57. Id. § 299.5(b) (enacted by Chapter 538).
58. Id. § 299.5(c)-(d) (enacted by Chapter 588).
59. Id. § 299.5(e) (enacted by Chapter 588). The interests held by the partners may be changed by an
instrument in writing. Id.
60. Id. § 299.5(f) (enacted by Chapter 588). This section provides that other laws cr regulations may so
provide. Id
61. See CAL GOV'T CODE § 22873(a) (enacted by Chapter 588) ("Any employer or contracting agency
may, at its option, offer health benefits pursuant to this article, to the domestic partners of its employees and
annuitants.").
62. AB 26 (1998) (as amended on Apr. 8, 1999, but not enacted).
63. Salladay, supra note 50, at A6.
64. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 22872 (enacted by Chapter 588).
65. Id.
66. Id. § 22867 (enacted by Chapter 583).
67. Id. §§ 22871, 22871.1, 22871.2 (enacted by Chapter 588).
68. Domestic Partner Benefits, supra note 17, at 48.
69. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1261(a) (enacted by Chapter 538); id. § 1261(a)(1)-(3) (enacted by
Chapter 588) (denying these visitation rights if no visitors are allowed, if the particular visitor would be disruptive
to the patient or facility staff, or if the patient indicates that she does not want the particular visitor present).
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in a manner that applies equally to spouses, registered domestic partners, and other
immediate family members." 70 In fact, the only benefit guaranteed to domestic
partners by Chapter 588 is this visitation right. Interestingly, this particular benefit
is already available to unmarried couples, as health care powers of attorney have
been available for several years, allowing the same visitation rights to any person
specified on the form.71
C. Terminating a Domestic Partnership
A DP is terminated if one partner mails written notice to the other72 or if they
fail to satisfy the eligibility criteria for forming a DP.73 Upon termination, at least
one partner must file a Notice of Termination of Domestic Partnership with the
Secretary of State.74 Notice must also be given to certain third parties.7' If notice to
these third parties is not given, the partner responsible for giving notice is liable for
losses incurred as a result.76 A former partner may not enter into a new DP within
six months of the filing of a Notice of Termination of Domestic Partnership unless
the DP ended because one partner died or married.77 This six-month waiting period
is similar to the six-month waiting period for a divorce or a dissolution to become
final.78
IV. ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER 588
A. Marriage versus Domestic Partnership
Polls suggest that Californians believe that same-sex couples should be given
many of the legal rights that come with marriage, but they stop short of wishing to
70. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 588, sec.1, at 3373.
71. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4680-4698 (West Supp. 2000) (providing for health care powers of
attorney).
72. l § 299(a)(1) (enacted by Chapter 588).
73. See id. § 299(a)(2)-(4) (enacted by Chapter 588) (stating that the DP terminates if one partner marries
or dies, or if the partners no longer have a common residence).
74. Id § 299(b) (enacted by Chapter 588).
75. See id. § 299(c) (enacted by Chapter 588) (providing that a third party who has been shown a
Declaration of Domestic Partnership must be notified of the termination of the partnership if the Declaration was
necessary for the purpose of qualifying the partners for some right or benefit).
76. Ud. Presumably, third parties who would be affected by this provision are those who have provided a
benefit to the partners because the partners formed a valid DP under California law. If the DP terminates, the
individual partners would no longer be eligible for the benefit. Thus, notice must be given to these third parties.
77. Id. § 298.5(c) (enacted by Chapter 588).
78. Compare CAL. FAM. CODE § 298.5(c) (enacted by Chapter 588) (providing for a six-month waiting
period after termination, unless termination was a result of one partner's death or marriage), with id. § 2339 (West
1994) (providing for a six-month waiting period for ajudgment of dissolution to become final). One may simply
marry in order to end a DP, but there is no comparable action to end a marriage. In this sense, DP is obviously a
less-favored status, because the restrictions upon it are not as great.
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call any same-sex union "marriage." 79 In this sense, DP seems to be a fitting
alternative.80
The requirements for entering into a DP under Chapter 588 are similar to the
requirements for forming a marriage.8 ' However, the rights and obligations that the
status of marriage and the status of DP confer are markedly different. The law
generally favors married couples, providing them with inheritance rights, property
rights, and tax benefits.8 2 The rights and obligations that DP registration provides
are wholly contained within the DP provisions of Chapter 588.83 Similarly, the DP
provisions in Chapter 588 are the only source of law governing the division of
jointly-acquired property after termination of the DP,64 and the new law creates no
new property rights.85 In contrast, the Family Code contains an entire section
detailing the rights and obligations of married couples, 6 and another section
governing the division of property upon dissolution.87
Chapter 588 is silent on the subject of DPs that are registered under the laws of
other jurisdictions. An earlier version of the law did recognize such DPs, but this
provision was omitted before enactment.88 Conversely, marriages performed in
other jurisdictions are valid in California.89 If married couples travel or move
outside of California, they enjoy substantially the same rights in the target state as
they did in California;9° but if domestic partners travel outside of California, they
become legal strangers to each other9' unless the target state recognizes California
79. See Jennifer K. Robbenholt & Monica Kirkpatrick Johnson, Legal Planning for Unmarried Committed
Partners: Empirical Lessonsfor a Preventive and Therapeutic Approach, 41 AmIZ. L. REV. 417,429 n.84 (1999)
(noting that 60% of Californians reporting were opposed to same-sex marriage, but 60-75% approved of granting
benefits such as health and family leave benefits and hospital visitation rights to same-sex domestic partners); see
also John Cloud, For Better or Worse in Hawaii, A Showdown over Marriage Tests the Limits of Gay Activism,
TME, Oct. 26, 1998, at 43, 43 (reporting that 29% of Americans polled believed that "homosexual marriages"
should be legal, and 64% believed that they should not be legal). See generally They Needn't Be Called
'Marriage, 'But Gay Unions Merit Legal Status, BUFFALO NEws, May 20, 1996, at B2 (expressing the view that
same-sex unions should be recognized, but that such couples should not be allowed to adopt children).
80. See Thomas F. Coleman, The Hawaii Legislature Has Compelling Reasons to Adopt a Comprehensive
Domestic Partnership Act, 5 LAw & SEXUALTY 541, 547-51 (1995) (indicating that the public opposes same-sex
marriage, but favors domestic partnership).
81. See supra Part II.A (comparing the requirements for forming a DP under Chapter 588 with the
requirements for forming a marriage under the California Family Code).
82. See Andrew Sullivan, The Conservative Case for Gay Marriage, OTTAWA CMZEN, Aug, 26, 1939, at
B3 (discussing the benefits of marriage and the benefits traditionally accorded to married couples).
83. CAL. FAM. CODE § 299.5(a) (enacted by Chapter 588).
84. Id. § 299.5(e) (enacted by Chapter 588).
85. Id. § 299.5(c)-(e) (enacted by Chapter 588).
86. Id. §§ 700-1620 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000).
87. Id. §§ 2500-2627 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000).
88. AB 26 (1998) (as amended on Apr. 8, 1999, but not enacted).
89. CAL FAM. CODE § 308 (West 1994).
90. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.").
91. HERTZ, supra note 11, at 23.
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DPs as valid.92 This phenomenon leads to unpleasant results if one partner is injured
outside of California: partners may not be entitled to visitation privileges or have
any input concerning health care options.
In spite of the disparity of benefits that marriage and DP legislation confer,
many people support DP.94 Same-sex couples wish to have legal recognition of their
relationships, even if no other benefits are available.95 Many same-sex couples,
however, do not like the limits of DP, refusing to accept nothing less than full
equality.96 Others favor marriage over DP, but believe that DP legislation is a
necessary step on the road to equality.97 Some people believe that all unmarried
couples should be eligible for benefits offered by DP programs, and argue that
unmarried opposite-sex couples are in the same position as gay and lesbian
couples. 98 Those who believe that DP benefits should only be available to same-sex
couples argue that same-sex couples are not allowed to marry and cannot obtain
benefits otherwise. 99 At least one court has agreed with this latter view, finding that
such a benefit program is not discrimination under Title VII,oe as an employee in
an opposite-sex relationship is not "similarly situated" to an employee in a same-
sex relationship.01
Opposition to DPs rest largely on moral grounds, often tied to religious
beliefs.'02 The fear is that the recognition of same-sex relationships amounts to
92. This is the reason that DP benefits and registries have value to unmarried couples: they provide legal
recognition of their relationship. Donovan, supra note 13, at 667.
93. The problem is much more acute if children are concerned. For instance, consider the situation in which
one partner is not the biological parent and has not been allowed to adopt the child. This partner may not be
allowed to make any decisions whatsoever about the child's care. HER7i, supra note 11, at 23.
94. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (discussing public opinion about DP versus marriage
for same-sex couples); Coleman, supra note 80, at 544-45 (arguing that legalizing same-sex marriage is not
appropriate, but a DP program granting the rights of marriage to same-sex couples would satisfy equal protection
arguments).
95. Scott Gold, For Gay Couples, Love Recognized, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), July 11, 1999,
at lB.
96. Gold, supra note 32, at IA.
97. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Comparative Law and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 31
McGEORGE-L. REv. (forthcoming 2000) (discussing the step-by-step approach).
98. See Raymond C. O'Brien, Domestic Partnership: Recognition and Responsibility, 32 SAN. DIEGO L.
REV. 163, 178 (1995) (pointing out that marriage laws discriminate against all unmarried couples); Foray v. Bell
Atlantic, a.k.a. Nynex Corp., 56 F. Supp. 2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (focusing on plaintiff's claim that he was
"similarly situated" to a woman with a female partner).
99. Carol Ness, Domestic Dilemmas: Legal Hoops for Same-Sex Partners, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 9,2000,
at Al.
100. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (1994).
101. Foray, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 329.
102. See, e.g., Donovan, supra note 17, at 373 (remarking that "antigay animosity ... and religious
fundamentalism are so tightly intertwined that the one implicates the other"); Carl Ingram, Senate OKs Benefits
for Same-Sex Partners, L.A. TIMES, May 26, 1999, at A3 (quoting Senator Richard Mountjoy concerning a DP
bill: "This bill is wrong. Men sleeping with men and women sleeping with women is wrong. It is wrong because
God said it is wrong"). But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,211-12 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("A
State can no more punish private behavior because of religious intolerance than it can punish such behavior
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legitimizing homosexuality.10 3 Similarly, others point to sodomy laws as
justification for opposition to same-sex marriage. °4 Moral objections, however,
appear to be a secondary concern with respect to the law, in view of the fact that
such things as contraceptives 0 5 and abortion' 6 are legal despite the moral stigma
that is attached to them.' 7
B. Alternative Solutions for Obtaining Benefits
Over the years, limited solutions to the problem of obtaining benefits for same-
sex couples have presented themselves. Some couples have turned to adult
adoption, which creates a legal relationship between the parties.1t 8 An adopting
partner may deduct health benefits for the adopted partner from his or her income
because of racial animus.").
103. Juel, supra note 25, at 320-21; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Three CulturalAnxieties Undermining the
Case for Same-Sex Marriage, 7 TEMP. POL & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 307, 315-19 (1998).
104. Mark Strasser, Sodomy, Adultery, and Same-Sex Marriage: On Legal Analysis and Fundamental
Interests, 8 UCLAWoMEN's LJ. 313,333-34 (1998). Examples of sodomy laws include, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-
6605 (1997) ("Every person who is guilty of the infamous crime against nature, committed with mankind or with
any animal, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than five years."); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-5-403(1) (1999) ("A person commits sodomy when the actor engages in any sexual act with a person who
is 14 years of age or older involving the genitals of one person and mouth or anus of another person, regardless
of the sex of either participant.'); fi. § 76-5-403(3) (1999) (declaring sodomy a misdemeanor in the State of Utah);
see also Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190 (holding that the U.S. Constitution does not protect "homosexual sodomy" as
a fundamental right). But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and Historiography, 1999 U. ILL L. REV. 631,
665 (arguing that the historical rationale for the Bowers decision was misguided). The view of DP as a step to
same-sex marriage has prompted opposing arguments concerning sodomy and polygamy. See generally David
L. Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 26 HOFsTRA L. REV. 53 (1997) (examining the efforts of same-
sex couples to obtain the right to marry in light of the historical response to polygamy by the government);
Strasser, svpra (arguing that sodomy laws are not a bar to same-sex marriage because married couples are
generally Lot included in their scope); Andrew Sullivan, Three's a Crowd: The Polygamy Diversion, NEW
REPUBLIC, June 17, 1996, at 10 (refuting the idea that polygamy and homosexuality are equivalent with respect
to traditional marriage).
105. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,450 (1972) (agreeing with the Court of Appeals in striking down
the Massachusetts ban on the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons, observing that "the statute was
contained in a chapter dealing with 'Crimes Against Chastity, Morality, Decency and Good Order'[;] it [was not
a health measure, but] was cast only in terms of morals").
106. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,850 (1992) ("Some of us as individuals find abortion
offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our obligation is to define
the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.").
107. Note also that morality is not a universal notion; acts prohibited in one state may be legal in another.
For examp.e, laws prohibiting gaming in California are contained in a section of the Penal Code entitled "Of
Crimes Against the Person Involving Sexual Assault, and Crimes Against Public Decency and Good Morals." See
CAL. PENAL CODE § 330 (West 1999) (defining "gaming" and specifying punishments for violations of
prohibitions against gaming). In Nevada, however, most forms of gaming are legal. See NEVt. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 463.0129(1) (Michie Supp. 1999) (finding the gaming industry beneficial to the State economy and declaring
the public policy of the State with respect to gaming, which, in part, provides that "all gaming establishments in
this state must remain open to the general public and the access of the general public to gaming activities must
not be restricted in any manner except as provided by the legislature").
108. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 9300-9340 (West 1994) (providing for adult adoptions under California law).
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taxes. 1 9 In addition, the adoptive partner may then take advantage of inheritance
rights.'10 On the other hand, adoptions are irrevocable, creating obvious problems
if the relationship does not last."' Such an arrangement may also subject the
partners to prosecution under incest statutes1 2 and the loss of inheritance rights
with respect to blood relatives 1 3 Overall, the judicial response to this solution has
been mixed.
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One difficulty regarding the provision of DP benefits is the absence of a system
to determine who is eligible for benefits and the difficulty of creating a fair
system.11 5 Such a system is in place: marriage.1 1 6 The logistical problems of
providing benefits to same-sex couples virtually disappear if same-sex marriage is
legalized. 117 All of the benefits same-sex couples could realize through Chapter
588-registry, insurance, visitation rights-would flow naturally if these couples
were simply allowed to marry. 8
C. Fiscal Considerations of Chapter 588
The fiscal impact of Chapter 588 is likely to be very small. The largest
expenditure will be in startup costs, the bulk of which consists of designing,
109. See I.R.C. § 105(b) (West Supp. 1999) (establishing that health benefits for a taxpayer's dependents
are tax-deductible).
110. Adam Chase, Tax PlanningforSame-Sex Couples, 72 DENv. U. L. REv. 359,386 (1995). Mechanisms
such as wills and trusts have been ineffective at safeguarding the property interests of same-sex partners, as blood
relatives often succeed in challenging these arrangements. L
11. Id. at 387.
112. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 285 (West 1999) (providing that people who fall within the degree of
relation for an incestuous marriage are subject to imprisonment if they fornicate or commit adultery with each
other).
113. Chase, supra note 110, at 387.
114. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d 1095,1099 (Del. 1993) (granting adoption ofa 51-year-
old male by a 61-year-old male by construing the adoption statute to allow adult adoptions for economic reasons);
In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424, 427 (N.Y. 1984) (denying adoption of a 50-year-old male by
a 57-year-old male on the ground that "[a]doption is not a means of obtaining a legal status for a nonmarital sexual
relationship").
115. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties that companies offering DP
benefits have had in designing and implementing verification systems).
116. See generally COMMISSION ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, REPORT TO THE 18TH
LEGISLATURE OF HAWAII 43-44 (1995) (concluding that "substantial public policy reasons" support extending
marriage benefits "in total" to same-sex couples); ESKRIDGE, supra note 10 (evaluating the legal, political, and
moral issues surrounding the prospect of same-sex marriage); ERIC MARCUS, TOGETHER FOREvER: GAY AND
LESBIAN MARRIAGE (1998) (same); ON THE ROAD TO SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: A SUPPORTIVE GUIDE TO
PSYCHOLOGICAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGALIssuEs (Robert P. Cabaj & David W. Purcell eds., 1998) (same);SAME-
SEX MARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1997) (same).
117. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text (discussing the problems encountered by companies
concerning DP benefits).
118. Legalizing same-sex marriage would also reinforce the idea that couples wishing to gain the benefits
of marriage must accept the responsibilities of marriage. Donovan, supra note 13, at 669.
20001Family
printing, and distributing the necessary forms. 19 The collection of filing fees is
expected to generate revenue that will eventually be greater than ongoing costs.
120
The cost to employers is unknown, since there is no absolute requirement to offer
benefits to employees' domestic partners; costs will depend on the number of
partners who seek benefits.12 ' Since DPs generally account for about 0.4% of plan
enrollment,'2 the costs are not likely to be great.
V. CONCLUSION
The DP registry that Chapter 588 establishes gives legal recognition to same-
sex and unmarried senior citizen couples.'2 The only couples who are eligible to
gain substantial benefits, however, are those in which one partner is a public
employee, and these gains are speculative. 24 Senior citizens are able to keep their
pension benefits without marrying, but also stand to gain little unless one partner
is a public employee.'25
The most important benefit flowing from Chapter 588 is that a framework has
been established upon which advocates may build. In the future, the Legislature
may decide to incorporate further rights and responsibilities into the provisions
governing DPs; the existence of the new Family Code sections created under
Chapter 588 makes that much easier to do. 126 However, upon the initial enactment
of Chapter 588, California will not provide its DPs with any concrete benefits
except visitation rights, which may already be obtained under existing law.1 27 If, in
fact, same-sex couples should be entitled to the many benefits of marriage, the most
logical solution is to allow them to marry.
28
119. SENATEAPPROPRIATIONSCOMMTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OFAB 26, at 1 (Sept. 1, 1999); sec CAL.
FAM. COD-- § 298 (enacted by Chapter 588) (providing that the Secretary of State is to prepare the forms and
establish filing fees).
120. SENATE APPROPRtATIONS COMMnTEF, COMMrrTEE ANALYSIS OFAB 26, at I (Sept. 1, 1999).
121. See UL (reporting the fiscal impact as "unknown, subject to employer option").
122. Domestic Partner Benefits, supra note 17, at 48.
123. CAL. FAm. CODE §§ 297-298 (enacted by Chapter 588).
124. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text (stating that public employers are not required to provide
benefits to domestic partners under Chapter 588; DPs will gain no benefits if employers refuse to provide them).
125. See supra text accompanying note 35 (acknowledging the fact that senior citizens may forfeit benefits
if they marry).
126. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (hypothesizing that the existence of a system to register DPs
may encourage other entities to offer benefits to DPs).
127. See supra Part I.B (evaluating the rights provided to DPs by Chapter 588 and concluding that
visitation rights in health facilities are the only benefit that DPs are certain to realize).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 115-18 (asserting that the problems cited in establishing DP benefit
systems would be solved by legalizing same-sex marriage). But see supra text accompanying notes 102-07
(discussing moral objections to DP programs, which also apply to same-set: marriage). See generally Baker v.
Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 912 (1999) (Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting) ("Finding no legally valid
justification for the sex-based classification, I conclude that the classification is a vestige of the historical unequal
marriage relationship that more recent legislative enactments and our own jurisprudence have unequivocally
rejected.').
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Family Code § 2040 (amended).
SB 357 (Ortiz); 1999 STAT. Ch. 118
I. INTRODUCTION
Sometimes the dissolution of a marriage can be longer and more complicated
than the original union. When emotional and financial stakes run high, aid from an
attorney is often necessary. However, due to an anomaly in the law, paying
attorney's fees from marital property has been difficult.2 Because an automatic
temporary restraining order (TRO) accompanies the summons issued with every
petition for marital dissolution,3 parties seeking legal representation have been
barred from utilizing their separate property to pay the attorney's retainer fees and
costs. 4 Parties have been allowed limited access to community property for the
1. See Schnabel v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. App. 4th 548, 550, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 169, 170 (1993)
(commenting that "[slometimes breaking up is hard to do. Such is the case here. Indeed, this is the third opinion
we have written, and the Supreme Court has also authored one... [a]nd still the parties are married."); see also
Davidson v. Davidson, 5 Cal. App. 3d 51, 53, 84 Cal. Rptr. 884,884-85 (1970) (detailing dissolution proceedings
for a couple married only two and a half years with attorney's fees of over $30,000); Esther M. Berger, To Love,
Honor and Litigate?: Dollars and Sense, TOWN & COUNTRY MONTHLY, Jan. 1, 1998, at 111 (stating, "A large
chunk of any divorce tab is, of course, the attorney's fee .... A contested dissolution is especially expensive,
lasting from six months to two or more years, and costing from several thousand dollars to several million.")
2. See Telephone Interview with Emily Shattel Edelman, First Vice-President, Beverly Hills Bar
Association (June 24, 1999) [hereinafter Edelman Interview] (notes on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(lamenting the restrictive nature of the law that only allows access to community property for the payment of
attorney retainer fees during dissolution proceedings, and detailing an experience with a client who had separate
property but was barred from using it to pay retainer fees).
3. See 1994 Cal. Stat. ch. 1269, sec. 13, at 6585 (enacting CALJ FAM. CODE § 2040(a)(2)) (requiring that
a restraining order be issued with a summons to prevent the transfer or encumbrance of community, quasi-
community, or separate property by the parties to dissolution proceedings). Prior law made allowances for the use
of community property for the payment of attorney retainer fees, but the statute remained silent regarding the use
of quasi-community and separate property for this purpose. Id.
4. See Edelman Interview, supra note 2 (citing personal experience with a client who had difficulty
accessing funds to pay his attorney retainer fee because the couple held no community property, and how he was
barred from using separate property to pay the attorney retainer fee).
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payment of legal fees during dissolution proceedings.5 However, determining which
assets are community property and which assets constitute separate property is
difficult in the early stages of a marital dissolution.6 Thus, parties in a dissolution
have been hindered in determining which marital property is available for use in
retaining legal representation.7 Chapter 118 was sponsored by the Beverly Hills Bar
Association, the California Judges Association, and the Family Law Section of the
California State Bar8 in an effort to include separate and quasi-community property
in the resources available for the parties to use for attorney's fees in a marital
dissolution proceeding. 9
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Types of Marital Property
California is a community property state, and California law recognizes three
types of marital property: community property, quasi-community property, and
separate property.10 Community property is the property acquired by a married
couple during the course of the marriage while domiciled in the State of
5. See 1994 Cal. Stat. ch. 1269, sec. 13, at 6585 (enacting CAL FAm. CODE § 2040(a)(2)) ( "[N]othing
in the restraining order shall preclude the parties from using community property to pay reasonable attorney's fees
in order to retain legal counsel in the proceeding.")
6. See Walter v. Walter, 57 Cal. App. 3d 802, 806-07, 129 Cal. Rptr. 351, 353-54 (1976) (holding that,
where distinction between community property and separate property is difficult, the party in error must account
for misappropriation of assets believed to be separate); SENATE FLOOR, ANALYSIS OF SB 357, at 2 (Apr. 1, 1999)
(noting the difficulties of determining which property is community property, and which is separate property, in
a long-standing marriage).
7. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITrEF, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OF SB 357, at 1 (Mar. 26, 1999) (citing
an instance in which the client of a member of the Beverly Hills Bar Association was prohibited from using his
own separate property to pay the attorney's retainer fee); Edelman Interview, supra note 2 (detailing a difficulty
with prior law prohibiting use of separate property for the purpose of paying attorney retainer fees).
8. See ASSEMBLY CoMMI=TEE ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF SB 357, at 1-2 (June 22, 1999) (listing the
sponsors of Chapter 118).
9. Id.
10. See CAL. FA . CODE § 760 (West 1994) (recognizing the concept of community property); id. § 125
(West 1994:) (discussing quasi-community property); id. § 770 (West 1994) (providing for the retention of separate
property); see also id. § 760 (establishing the definition of community property as "all property, real or personal,
wherever situated, acquired by a married person during the marriage while domiciled in this state"); Id. § 125
(defining the term"quasi-community" property as including "all property, wherever situated, that would have been
treated as community property had the acquiring spouse been domiciled in California at the time of acquisition");
id § 770 (describing "separate property of a married person" as including "(1) [a]ll property owned by the person
before marriage; [and] (2) [a]ll property acquired by the person after marriage by gift, bequest, devise or descent").
See generally In re Marriage of Haines, 33 Czl. App. 4th 277, 288-89, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 673, 680-81 (1995)
(delineating the historical background of community property in California).
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 31
California." California law creates a rebuttable presumption that all property
acquired during the course of a marriage is community property. 2
Quasi-community property is property that was acquired during marriage by
either spouse while the spouse was domiciled in another state that would have been
considered community property if he or she had been domiciled in California at the
time of acquisition. 3 Separate property includes gifts received or items inherited
during the marriage, as well as property acquired prior to the marriage. 4 Although
separate property is very clearly defined by statute, 5 determining which property
is separate property during a dissolution is often difficult.'
6
B. Use of Marital Property During Dissolution
The division of marital property can be controversial in a dissolution, and often
the court must protect the community estate from use and abuse by both parties. 7
To protect the shared assets of a married couple, existing law provides that a
restraining order is automatically included with the service of summons, restricting
the use of community property, quasi-community property, and separate property
until the court can equitably divide the assets.' 8
11. CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (West 1994).
12. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2581 (West 1994) ("[P]roperty acquired by the parties during marriage in joint
form.. . is presumed to be community property... ."); Haines, 33 Cal. App. 4th at 291, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 682
(stating the principles of characterization for each type of marital property).
13. CAL. FAM. CODE § 125 (West 1994); see Fredericks v. Fredericks, 226 Cal. App. 3d 875, 879,277 Cal.
Rptr. 107, 109 (1991) (holding that "[a] California court determining whether property is quasi-community must
first decide whether the property would have been community property in this state had the parties been domiciled
here at the time of its acquisition.")
14. See CAL FAM. CODE § 770 (West 1994) (stating that the "[s]eparate property of a married person
includes all of the following: (1) [a]ll property owned by the person before marriage; (2) [aIll property acquired
by the person after marriage by gift, bequest, devise, or descent")
15. See id. (classifying separate property as any property gained by a spouse prior to the marriage, and any
property received by a spouse through gift or bequest).
16. SeegenerallyWILLAMP.HOGOBOOM&DONALDB.KING, CALiFORNIAPRAclCEGUIDEFAMILYLAW
8:30-8:560-574 (1999) (clarifying that parties may agree to the characterization of property at the time of
dissolution, but absent such an agreement, characterization is made by the court based primarily on the time of
acquisition); Joseph W. McKnight, Defining Property Subject to Division at Divorce, 23 FAM. L.Q. 193, 207-08
(1989) (explaining that "[r]echaracterization of assets may result from commingling of non marital property with
marital property such that the nonmarital property is no longer identifiable").
17. See, e.g., Van Hook v. Van Hook, 147 Cal. App. 3d 970,980, 195 Cal. Rptr. 541,547 (1983) (speaking
of the court's interest in freezing assets until a final decision can be reached in the dissolution).
18. See CAL FAM. CODE § 2040(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 118) (mandating that the restraining order be
served along with the summons, restraining both parties from "transferring, encumbering, hypothecating,
concealing, or in any way disposing of any property, real or personal, whether community, quasi-community or
separate, without the written consent of the other party or an order of the court, except in the usual course of
business or for the necessities of life"); see also CAL. CtV. PROC. CODE § 412.20 (West 1973) (explaining the
required process for proper service, and providing a description of the content of a proper summons); SENATE
FLOOR, COMMITrEEANALYSIS OF SB 357, at 1 (Apr. 1, 1999) (declaring that the procedure for serving a summons
on the other party in dissolution proceedings automatically includes the issuance of a temporary restraining order).
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However, two exceptions existed as to the requirement of a restraining order.
One exception allows parties to use community property assets to retain counsel in
the pending dissolution proceedings.19 Significantly, prior to Chapter 118 the law
did not establish an exception permitting quasi-community property and separate
property to be used to pay attorney's fees and costs during dissolution. 0
The second exception to the restraining order requirement provides that
community, quasi-community, and separate assets can be used by the parties for
expenses incurred during the "usual course of business or... [for] necessities of
life. ' 21 For non-necessity expenses, called "extraordinary" expenditures, a party
must give five days' notice to the other party and account to the court for these
expenditures.2 Attorney retainer fees and initial discovery costs are typically a
large enough expenditure to be considered "extraordinary," and accounting to the
court for that expenditure often requires legal representation. 23 Thus, attorneys
whose clients do not have access to community property with which they can pay
retainer fees must represent their clients in these extraordinary expenditure
proceedings without having been paid a retainer fee.24
This type of scenario led the Beverly Hills Bar Association to sponsor Chapter
118. One of their members found the law an impediment to a client who wished to
retain the attorney's services but was prevented from using separate property to do
so72 Prior to Chapter 118, a spouse could not utilize separate property or quasi-
19. See 1994 Cal. Stat. ch. 1269, sec. 13, at 6585 (enacting CAL. PEN. CODE § 2040(a)(2)) (providing only
for the use of community property for the payment of attorney retainer fees).
20. Ild.; see also SENATEJUDICIARYCOMMITrEECOMMITTEEANALYSISOFSB 357, at 3 (Mar. 23, 1999)
(stating that the statute is silent on the use of quasi-community and separate property for payment of retainer fees
to an attorney for assistance in dissolution proceedings.)
21. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2040(a)(2) (West Supp. 1994). See generally Droeger v Friedman, Sloan & Ross,
54 Cal. 3d 26, 42, 812 P.2d 931, 940 (1991) (stating that "debts incurred after separation, other than for the
necessaries of life, are the separate obligation of the spouse who incurred the debt").
22. See CAL FAM. CODE § 2040(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 118) (requiring each party'"to notify the other
party of any proposed extraordinary expenditures at least five business days before incurring those expenditures
and to account to the court for all expenditures made after service of the summons on that party").
23. See SENATE JUDICIARY CoMMTrrEE, COMMrFTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 357, at 3-4 (Mar. 23, 1999)
(claiming that while
"nothing in existing law prevents a party from petitioning the court for an order allowing the party to
use his or her own separate property, upon a clear showing of ownership, for any us- whatsoever,
including payment of his or her attorney's retainer, the attorney may have to go to court without the
retainer having been paid beforehand").
24. See id. at 3 (noting that, while a party can petition the court when a party wants to use quasi-community
or separate property, the party might still need representation to present such a petition before the court).
25. See Edelman Interview, supra note 2 (clarifying that the purpose of letting spouses utilize the
community property for retainer fees was to enable a spouse who otherwise would not have had funds to retain
an attorney for the impending proceedings).
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community property to pay retainer fees, but was allowed to use community
property for that very purpose.26
III. CHAPTER 118
Chapter 118 remedies an anomaly in prior law that prevented parties from
utilizing separate or quasi-community property to pay attorney's retainer fees.' The
new law continues to allow a party to use community property for payment of
retainer fees, but specifically allows parties in a dissolution proceeding to use quasi-
community property and separate property to pay attorney's fees as well.28
This broadening of the exceptions to the automatic restraining order provides
parties greater access to their separate resources. 29 As a safeguard, parties using
community property and quasi-community property to pay attorney's fees must
"account to the community for the use of the property."30 Similarly, if a spouse
makes an error and uses property that is later determined to belong to his or her
spouse, then he or she will be required to account to the other for the expenditure
of that property.3 Thus, Chapter 118's provision for an accounting to the
community or to the other party for expenditures for attorney's fees is meant to
protect the available assets from misuse during dissolution proceedings.32
IV. ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER 118
The purpose and effect of Chapter 118 is to correct a minute oversight in the
law.33 When a married couple does not have community property, the restriction
upon use of quasi-community and separate property hinders payment of attorney's
fees in anticipation of dissolution proceedings34 The purpose of allowing access to
community property for payment of attorney fees is to make legal representation
26. 1994 Cal. Stat. ch. 1269, sec. 13, at 6585 (enacting CAL. FAM. CODE § 2040(a)(2)); see, e.g., Edelman
Interview, supra note 2 (detailing an experience in which a client was prevented from using his separate property
to pay Ms. Edelman's retainer fees).
27. See ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMrrIEE ANALYSIS OF SB 357, at 1 (June 22, 1999)
(claiming that Chapter 118 will "correct what seems to be an oversight in the law[, as] ... [aillowing parties to
a dissolution to use community property to retain legal counsel, as the [law] currently does, but not to use their
own separate property, seems illogical").
28. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2040(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 118).
29. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMM arEE, COMMlrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 357, at 2 (Mar. 26, 1999)
(explaining that the intent of the amendment is to expand available resources for the procurement of an attorney
to parties in dissolution proceedings).
30. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2040(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 118).
31. Id.
32. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM aTEE, COMMTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 357, at 4 (Mar. 26, 1999).
33. See ASSEMBLY COMMrlTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 357, at I (June 22, 1999)
(noting that Chapter 118 was drafted to correct an oversight in the law).
34. See Edelman Interview, supra note 2 (providing anecdotal evidence showing that restricting the use
of quasi-community property and separate property can inhibit a party's ability to pay attorney retainer fees).
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possible for all parties.3" Because community property is utilized for this purpose,
preventing parties from utilizing quasi-community property or separate property as
a means toward the same end seems illogical.36
Quasi-community property, along with community property, is viewed by the
court as comprising the community estate.37 This community estate is then split
equitably by the court among the parties." Thus, judicial treatment of quasi-
community property is no different than treatment of community property in
dissolution proceedings.39 Consequently, the result is the same whether attorney's
fees are paid from community property or quasi-community property, because both
combine to form the community estate that is divided upon dissolution.
Because dissolution proceedings are designed to split the community estate,
separate property is not intended to be within the scope of the court's jurisdiction. 0
Separate property becomes involved in dissolution proceedings only when parties
disagree as to the categorization of particular assets as community, quasi-
community, or separate property.41 Thus, use of a wife's separate property to obtain
legal representation for herself would not affect the sum of the community estate
that the court seeks to protect until the estate's division.4 2 Even if one spouse uses
property later determined to be community property to pay retainer fees, the
utilization of that community property for payment of such fees is permissible
35. See id. (declaring that the purpose behind allowing access to community property for payment of
attorney's fees was to aid parties in obtaining legal representation).
36. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (opining that preventing access to quasi-community property
and separate property while allowing use of community property for payment of attorney retainer fees is not
logical).
37. Craig v. Craig, 219 Cal. App. 3d 683, 686,268 Cal. Rptr. 396,397 (1990).
38. Id.
39. id.; see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 2580(c) (West 1994) (asserting that "a compelling state interest exists
to provide for uniform treatment of property").
40. See Reid v. Reid, 112 Cal. 274, 277, 44 P. 564, 564 (1896) (stating that the trial court had no
jurisdiction to divide separate property belonging to Mrs. Reid); Doris v. Doris, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1208, 1215,207
Cal. Rptr. 160, 164 (1984) ("It is well established that the family law court has no jurisdiction in dissolution of
marriage proceedings to dispose of either party's separate property.")
41. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (observing that separate property and community property
can become commingled over the course of a marriage, and that the court's role is to determine which assets are
part of the community estate in order to divide the shared assets equitably). See generally Gowan v. Gowan, 54
Cal. App. 4th 80, 88, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 456-57 (1997) ("When a trial court concludes that property contains
both separate and community interests, the court has very broad discretion to fashion an apportionment of interests
that is equitable under the circumstances of the case.'); Hirsch v. Hirsch, 211 Cal. App. 3d 104, 109-10, 259 Cal.
Rptr. 39, 43 (1989) (demonstrating the court's ability to characterize property as either separate or community in
nature during dissolution proceedings).
Separate property is not part of the community estate. Because the court has an interest in protecting the
community estate but not in overseeing the access each party has to his or her own separate property, use of
separate property to pay attorney's fees will not diminish the community estate that the court seeks to protect. See
supra note 41 and accompanying text (explaining that "separate property is not ... within the scope of the court's
jurisdiction").
42. CAL FAm,. CODE § 2040(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 118).
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under California law.43 If the property used is later determined to belong to the
spouse as separate property, the clause in Chapter 118 providing for accountability
among parties sufficiently safeguards against wrongful use.' Therefore, restricting
access to separate property is illogical, because such access would not diminish the




As difficult as marital dissolutions can be, attorneys are a necessary part of the
process. While a TRO provides protections against the use and abuse of marital
assets to the detriment of the other party, exceptions must exist to allow for the
retainer fees of attorneys. 6 Under Chapter 118, the exception to a TRO that allows
access to community property for the payment of attorney retainer fees is extended
to include quasi-community property and separate property.47 This extended access
is beneficial because clients will no longer worry about what type of assets they
may utilize to obtain legal representation, and attorneys will no longer have to
represent clients in dissolution proceedings prior to receiving an initial payment for
their services.48
43. Id.
44. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (proclaiming prior law to have been illogical because it
prevented access to quasi-community property and separate property while allowing use of community property
for payment of attorney retainer fees).
45. Supra note 27.
46. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (detailing the purpose behind, and the procedures required
in, issuing a TRO upon service of a summons in a dissolution proceeding). See generally Berger, supra note 1,
at 111 (warning that, prior to dissolution, a "spouse may squirrel away assets, 'shrinking' his or her apparent
financial worth in an effort to drive down the final settlement or judgment amount," and recommending that
parties hire a forensic accountant to find any missing or squandered money).
47. See supra Part IV (analyzing the effects of implementing Chapter 118).
48. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (stating that, under prior law, attorneys often had to
appear at "extraordinary expense" hearings prior to being paid attorney retainer fees if their clients did not have
access to community property); see also supra note 29 and accompanying text (emphasizing that the purpose of
Chapter 118 is to broaden access to all types of marital property for the benefit of the parties to a dissolution).

